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Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) has a long tradition as a broadly-used instrument for assessing 
transport infrastructure investments. In a CBA, the discount rate often determines whether a 
project passes the benefit-cost test. One concern is that literature on the subject offers widely 
differing recommendations regarding which discount rate should be used. What has not yet been 
studied is the way practitioners translate these (inconclusive) recommendations into the 
discounting policies applied to transport CBA. This paper aims to bridge this gap by analyzing 
how the rationales and arguments for underpinning discounting policies provided in literature 
are translated into five practices: the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark. It does so by studying the countries’ transport appraisal guidelines and interviewing 
experts. This study observes that the five practices attempt to fully substantiate the discount rate 
in empirical results from (academic) studies. However, apart from empirical evidence, 
discounting policies in the five countries are based on practical arguments, political-
administrative arguments and judgmental arguments. In some cases these judgments are 
inevitable because the empirical evidence is inconclusive, but in other cases discretionary 
decisions are made without any references to empirical evidence. The most important conclusion 
of this study is that both the political-administrative arguments and judgmental arguments are 
not – or are poorly – communicated in the guidelines of the five countries. This makes it difficult 
for the user of the CBA to decide whether s/he agrees with the reasonableness of the judgments. 
Finally, this study discusses solutions to improve the transparency of discounting policies.  
 
Keywords: Cost-Benefit Analysis; Infrastructure Project Appraisal; Discount Rate; Transport Appraisal; 
Guidelines. 
1. Introduction  
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) has a long tradition as a widely-used instrument, providing 
information to decision makers about the societal costs and benefits of carrying out transport 
infrastructure investments (e.g., Asplund and Eliasson, 2016; Naess, 2006; Sager, 2013; Welde and 
Odeck, 2011). Basically, a CBA is an overview of all the positive effects (benefits) and negative 
effects (costs) of a project or policy option (e.g., van Wee, 2012). These costs and benefits are 
quantified as far as possible and expressed in monetary terms using the notion of households’ 
willingness to pay for these effects (e.g., Boadway, 2006). Finally, government projects are 
typically intertemporal in nature, so the benefits and costs occur over a number of periods (e.g., 
Boadway, 2006). To deal with this, they are presented as so-called present values, implying that – 
even after a correction for inflation – it is better to have one euro or dollar now than in ten years’ 
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time, for example (van Wee, 2012). The discount rate is used to express this valuation. Often, 
present values are aggregated to yield an indicator of the project’s net impact on social welfare.  
 
In a CBA the discount rate often determines whether a project passes the benefit-cost test (e.g., 
Arrow et al., 2014; Gollier 2012a).2 Hence, the choice of the discount rate can have an important 
impact on the decision-making process in practices which use CBA to provide information for 
decision-making about the extent to which funding is approved for a specific transport project 
(examples are Chile, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, see Gomez-Lobo, 2012; DfT, 2014, 
2015; Mouter et al., 2013). The choice of the discount rate might matter less in practices in which 
CBA is used to rank large numbers of transport investments against each other because, over 
time, projects with similar cost and benefit profiles are affected by the discount rate in the same 
way (examples are Sweden and Norway, see Eliasson et al., 2015). However, for two reasons, 
discounting policies might also have a major influence in practices in which CBA is formally 
applied as a ranking tool: 1) When projects do not have similar cost and benefit profiles the 
discount rate can substantially affect the ranking of projects. It is conceivable that projects do not 
have similar profiles. For instance, a new high-speed rail line might have a different profile than a 
modest road expansion; 2) literature indicates that in reality CBA is used to inform go/no go 
decisions about transport investments in practices in which CBA is formally institutionalized as a 
ranking tool. Eliasson and Lundberg (2012) concluded that in Sweden planners primarily use 
CBA as a screening tool to avoid investments with negative net benefits – even though formally, 
CBA should be used to rank project proposals against each other. Moreover, Nyborg (1998) 
observed that Norwegian politicians tend to use CBA as a screening device to identify projects 
with a very negative benefit-cost ratio.  
 
One concern that has been put forward in existing literature is that scholars provide widely 
differing recommendations regarding the appropriate discount rate that practitioners should use 
(e.g., Harrison, 2010). However, the way practitioners translate these (inconclusive) 
recommendations into applied discounting policies for transport CBA is not studied in the 
literature. This paper aims to bridge this gap by analyzing how the rationales and arguments for 
underpinning discounting policies provided by the literature are translated into five practices: 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Based on this in-depth 
assessment it is possible to establish the extent to which practices struggle with similar problems 
regarding the translation of prescriptions from the literature into applied discounting policies. 
The identification of (generic) problems allows us to provide recommendations for improving 
discounting practices.  
 
A secondary goal of this study is to examine the differences between the five practices in terms of 
the underpinning of discounting policies. Various studies establish that countries around the 
world use very different discount rates, but these studies do not provide (potential) explanations 
for these differences (e.g., Boardman et al., 2013; Mackie and Worsley, 2013; Naess, 2006; Olsson 
et al., 2012). We identify potential explanations through studying the countries’ transport 
appraisal guidelines and interviewing experts. 
 
This study might inspire academics who aim to conduct research which better enables 
practitioners to design discounting policies in the face of varying prescriptions from literature. 
The societal contribution of our study is that practitioners can adopt the recommendations for 
improving discounting policies addressed in this study. Moreover, practitioners from the five 
countries included in this study can learn from each other’s practices where rationales for 
discounting policies differ. When practitioners learn that the rationale used in another practice is 
‘better’, improvements can be made by ‘transplanting’ the rationale. However, when 
                                                        
2 For instance, the discount rate is extremely important in the evaluation of the optimal level of climate policy 
(e.g., Nordhaus, 1994; Stern, 2008). 
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practitioners conclude that rationales employed in their own practice are superior, the result of 
the confrontation is that the rationale for the domestic practice is underpinned in a better way, 
which can also be considered as a learning effect. Practitioners that are charged with 
(re)designing discounting policies in other countries which apply CBA (e.g., France, New 
Zealand, Australia, United States, Chile and Japan) can also benefit from this study by examining 
the rationales that are employed in their practice and comparing them with the rationales of the 
five countries analyzed in this study. Also, a review of the rationales used in mature practices can 
be informative for practitioners from countries that aspire to institutionalize CBA in their 
practice, such as Serbia (Designing and Development Public Enterprise Roads of Serbia, 2010). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodology. Section 
3 provides an overview of (theoretical) arguments for underpinning discounting policies that are 
prevailing in scientific literature. Section 4 discusses the discounting policies of the five countries. 
Section 5 provides a critical assessment of the discounting policies. Section 6 provides 
conclusions and a discussion.  
2. Methodology 
As it would be almost impossible to analyze and compare the discounting policies of all of the 
countries worldwide that apply CBA within a reasonable period of time, the discounting policies 
of five countries (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) have 
been selected and are analyzed in this study. These countries were selected because they are 
regarded by several scholars as countries with serious (and well-documented) CBA track records 
(e.g., Mackie and Worsley, 2013; Odgaard et al. 2005), which enhances the feasibility of meeting 
this study’s research goals.3 To survey the five discounting policies, transport appraisal 
guidelines were examined and 38 CBA experts were interviewed. The 38 experts interviewed for 
this study4 were academics, consultants and policy makers who have experience with transport 
CBAs. Table 1 classifies the respondents in relation to their profession and country.  
 
Table 1:  Respondent classified in relation to their profession and country 
 
 Academic Consultant Policy maker Total 
The Netherlands 2 1 1 4 
United Kingdom 5 2 2 9 
Norway 6 1 2 9 
Sweden 5 0 2 7 
Denmark 4 2 3 9 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and consisted of three parts. Firstly, when the country’s 
discounting policy was not communicated in an English language publication, the interviews 
were used to reveal the policy. Secondly, respondents were asked about the underpinning of the 
discounting policy applied and about the process of deciding upon the discounting policy. This 
was the most important part of the interviews, considering the aim of this study to analyze how 
the rationales and arguments for underpinning discounting policies provided by existing 
literature are translated into the five practices. Thirdly, respondents were asked to reflect on the 
policy’s merits and, when applicable, they were asked to reflect on the observations of other 
                                                        
3 The scope of the study is the discounting policies of the five practices chosen. It cannot be claimed that the 
results of this study are, by definition, representative for all countries worldwide that apply CBA for their 
transport projects as, before carrying out this study, it proved to be very difficult to identify the extent to which 
the discounting policies of these five countries are a representative sample.  
4 Respondents were approached by email. 35 interviews were telephone interviews. Three Danish respondents 
preferred to answer questions and follow up questions via e-mail.  
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respondents.5 When applicable, the interview guide was updated. For instance, because the first 
interview with a Swedish respondent revealed that the discount rate had recently been decreased 
from 4% to 3.5%, the following question was added to the interview guide for Swedish 
respondents: “I heard that the discount rate for transport projects in Sweden recently dropped from 4% to 
3.5%. My question is: what was the argument for this decrease?” We used an inductive and grounded 
approach to analyze our data because we did not had strong a priori expectations regarding 
respondents’ answers to the three categories of questions (Bryman, 2008). This means that the 
data analysis was conducted without formulating hypotheses in advance.  
 
The respondents were recruited in two rounds. In the first round, one clear CBA proponent, one 
clear CBA antagonist and one policy maker were interviewed. The rationale was that the CBA 
proponent and antagonist could provide different perspectives on their practice and the policy 
maker would be able to provide detailed information with respect to procedures. These 
respondents were identified by consulting fellow academics. For instance, in the case of Sweden 
several academics were asked to provide suggestions for a CBA antagonist and policy maker 
who were able to provide reflections concerning the Swedish discounting policy.6 
 
The respondents were also asked who else needed to be interviewed in order to obtain a 
complete picture of their practice. In the second round, the people put forward by the first round 
respondents were interviewed. Because the meticulousness of the guidelines and the awareness 
of respondents in terms of underpinning discounting policies differed between the practices, the 
number of respondents interviewed varied per country. For instance, it was necessary to 
interview nine Norwegian, Danish and British respondents to obtain a comprehensive picture of 
the underpinnings for each country’s discounting policy and only four Dutch respondents 
needed to be interviewed for the same purpose, because the Dutch Discount Rate Working 
Group (2015) recently published a very extensive report regarding its discounting policy.    
3. Literature Review: Rationales for underpinning discounting policies     
Because this study aims to analyze how rationales and arguments for underpinning discounting 
policies provided by existing literature are translated into five practices, it is firstly important to 
provide a review of arguments for underpinning discounting policies that are prevailing in 
scientific literature. 
3.1. Rationales for underpinning the risk-free social discount rate 
Approaches to choosing social discount rates (discount rates applied to public projects) can 
generally be placed into two categories: the descriptive approach and the prescriptive approach 
(e.g., Arrow et al., 1995; Baum, 2009; Howard, 2013). The descriptive approach selects discount 
rates that reflect the real-world market behavior of people today. It implicitly assumes that the 
‘individual discount rate’ that households apply to personal benefits and costs equals the ‘social 
discount rate’ that individuals would apply to social benefits and costs (Howard, 2013). When 
performing a CBA for a government project, the descriptive approach sets the social discount rate 
equal to the rate of return money would receive had it not been used in the project. It is generally 
assumed that money not used in a government project would stay in the hands of private citizens 
and be invested (Howard, 2013). As such, it is common practice to set the risk-free discount rate 
to be equal to some measure of the real rate of return on investment in the private sector. Hence, 
                                                        
5 In such cases the names of these other respondents were not revealed.  
6 Contrary to our expectations we did not find interesting diverging perspectives among proponents and 
antagonists regarding the main goal of our study. Hence, we do not use this distinction in the remainder of the 
paper.  
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this approach is also coined as the ‘opportunity cost of capital approach’ (Nordhaus, 2007). 
Descriptivists, such as Nordhaus (1994, 2007), argue that social discount rates should be inferred 
from individual discount rates because there is no (ethical) justification for choosing a discount 
rate which is not fully grounded in actual behavior. Moreover, Azar (2007) asserts that using the 
same discount rate for public and private investments ensures that they are treated equally, since 
they use up similar financial resources that should be valued using the same opportunity cost of 
funds. 
 
The prescriptive approach to discounting derives social discount rates from fundamental ethical 
views, even if the resulting rates do not match market rates (e.g., Dasgupta, 2008; Stern, 2008). A 
first argument employed by prescriptivists to criticize the descriptive approach is that standing is 
only granted to contemporary humans who participate in financial markets (Baum, 2009). In the 
descriptive approach, people today may value the stakes of the next generation, but it is also 
plausible that individuals may only optimize consumption over one’s own lifetime and not 
consider future generations in their market behavior. Prescriptivists therefore conclude that the 
social discount rate for government projects affecting future generations can only be established 
based on ethical considerations about the way future project effects should (ethically) be valued 
compared to present project effects. Obviously standing issues are relevant when establishing 
discount rates for policies which will affect future generations (e.g., climate change policies). 
However, it can be argued that this prescriptivist critique is only relevant for the assessment of 
specific types of transport projects, these being projects with intergenerational impacts (e.g., high-
speed rail lines and long-term subsidizing of electric vehicles).  
 
Although standing issues may not pertain to transport projects with short-term impacts, Baum 
(2009) establishes that for these projects too, it holds true that analysts cannot avoid injecting their 
value judgments into the selection of the discount rate. First of all, the existence of multiple 
market rates implies that analysts cannot consider any one single market rate to describe how 
society discounts. In choosing one of these rates (whichever they choose), descriptivists impose 
their values upon society (Baum, 2009). Moreover, authors such as Stern (2008) and Sagoff (1988) 
argue that the social discount rate should be grounded in public discount rates instead of private 
discount rates, because individuals may not discount impacts that accumulate for themselves in 
the same fashion as impacts that accrue for others, or society as a whole. Stern (2008) asserts that 
in imperfect economies (suffering from, amongst others, externalities and missing markets), the 
social value of a unit of private consumption/investment may be different from the social value 
of a unit of public investment. According to Stern, it is a serious mistake to argue that the social 
discount rate should be anchored by importing one of the many private rates of return on the 
markets. Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004, p. 191) make a similar claim, arguing that using 
private market behavior as a standard for public policy overlooks the possibility that people will 
have different preferences when they take on different roles: “the future seems to matter more to 
American citizens than to American consumers, even though they are, of course, the same people. For 
example, Americans are notoriously bad at saving money on their own, apparently expressing a disinterest 
in the future. But Social Security is arguably the most popular entitlement program in the United States. 
The tension between Americans’ personal saving habits and their enthusiasm for Social Security implies a 
sharp divergence between the temporal preferences of people as consumers and citizens”. Howard (2013) 
finds empirical evidence for the claim that individuals do indeed discount personal impacts 
differently than social impacts. He concludes that individuals discount social payments at a 
lower rate than personal payments, based on a comparison of individuals’ discount rates for 
monetary payments that accrue to the individual with monetary payments that benefit society 
more generally. The distinction between public discount rates and personal discount rates might 
be particularly relevant for the evaluation of transport projects, as recent research projects 
indicate that individuals evaluate impacts of transport projects differently in their roles as 
consumer and citizen (e.g., Mouter et al., 2017).  
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In case the discount rate is not selected based on market rates (‘opportunity cost of capital 
approach’), analysts aim to establish the rate at which individuals are willing to trade future 
consumption with consumption today, also known as the ‘consumption behavior approach’. 
Present wealth can either be spent on present consumption or invested, thereby increasing future 
consumption. In this case, the discount rate can be expressed through the so-called Ramsey 
model which was designed to assess tradeoffs between present and future consumptions: 
 
𝑑 = 𝑝 + 𝐿 + 𝜇𝑔               (1) 
 
When the parameters are set based on empirical observations, d denotes the discount rate, p is 
the rate of pure time preference7 (also coined as the rate of impatience), L reflects the possibility 
that, because of a future exogenous calamity (for example, an asteroid hitting the earth), some 
future generations might not ever arrive (Goulder and Williams, 2012), g is relative consumption 
growth per capita and μ describes how fast the marginal utility of consumption declines as 
consumption increases. Subsequently, the discount rate can be determined by estimating the 
parameters in the Ramsey equation.  
 
If there were no distortions (e.g., capital income taxes), externalities associated with saving or 
inefficiencies in markets (e.g., restrictions on the ability of households to borrow or lend), the 
‘consumption behavior approach’ and the ‘opportunity cost of capital approach’ would compute 
the same risk-free discount rate (e.g., Arrow et al., 2013; Boadway, 2006; Gollier, 2012a). That is, 
market interest rates may not reflect true consumption discount rates (Boadway, 2006). Given 
that distortions exist in any economy, it would be extremely surprising if the two rates were the 
same (Baumol, 1986). Hence, there is the apparent problem of choosing between them (Pearce 
and Ulph, 1999). In existing literature, both approaches are often discussed as justifiable 
frameworks (e.g., Arrow et al., 2013). However, the ‘consumption behavior approach’ is often 
mentioned as the preferred theoretical framework (e.g., Gollier, 2012a; Groom et al., 2005), since, 
as a result of market distortions, capital markets do not reflect consumer preferences very well. A 
practical issue concerning the use of the ‘opportunity cost of capital’ approach for evaluating 
projects with long time horizons is that bonds with maturities longer than thirty or fifty years do 
not exist in any significant quantity in sufficiently liquid markets, which makes it difficult to infer 
a risk-free discount rate for such projects (Gollier, 2012a). Despite these downsides, leading 
scholars in the field believe that the risk-free discount rate, computed using the ‘opportunity cost 
of capital’ approach, can provide a ‘reality check’ on the risk-free discount rate computed using 
the ‘consumption behavior approach’ (Arrow et al., 2012). 
 
Prescriptivists claim that the parameters p and μ should be based on value judgments instead of 
empirical observations (e.g., Stern, 2008). In their view, determining the pure rate of time 
preference (p) is a normative rather than an empirical question: ‘how much should future well-
being count, relative to current well-being, in the social welfare function?’ According to Stern 
(2008) such questions can be answered through thought experiments. Various scholars argue 
from a normative perspective that the pure rate of time preference should be zero because a 
positive value for p means that – all other things being equal – the further into the future we go, 
the less worth we attach to the well-being of people living there (e.g., Broome, 1992; Gollier, 
2012a; Solow, 1974; Ramsey, 1928). For instance, Ramsey (1928) states that: “it is assumed that we 
do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible 
and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination”. Ramsey viewed discounting as unethical for 
the social planner because when horizons are long and one discounts, the future agent that the 
social planner serves disappears (Shively, 2002). From a normative point of view, the variable μ 
in the Ramsey equation can be interpreted as a measure of society’s relative aversion to 
                                                        
7 The rate of pure time preference reflects individuals’ preference for consumption now, rather than later, with an 
unchanging level of consumption per capita over time.  
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intertemporal inequality (e.g., Gollier, 2012a; Goulder and Williams, 2012). The more weight 
society gives to equality between generations, the higher the value of the parameter (Arrow et al., 
1995).  
 
Another ethical argument put forward by John Rawls is that the whole idea of calculating a 
‘correct’ or ‘efficient’ discount rate is a mistake (van Liederkerke, 2004). From a Rawlsian 
perspective, one should first answer the question of what a just and fair distribution of savings 
between generations could be, and then continue to look for the discount rate which meets this 
aim. People who are charged with setting the discount rate should forget the mathematical frame 
and ask themselves what justice between generations entails and then do the math (van 
Liederkerke, 2004). Shively (2002, p.5) also suggests to ‘do the ethics before the math’: “If 
discounting provides a result to which we object later on ethical grounds, we might conclude that 
discounting was an inappropriate tool for use”. Various authors argue from a normative perspective 
that countries ought not to use a (high) discount rate, since this results in ‘a dictatorship of the 
present over the future’ (Chichilnisky, 1997), an unsustainable future (e.g., Gowdy, 2010; Pigou, 
1932), it breaches principles of intergenerational justice (e.g., Davidson, 2006) and requires a 
world view that neglects issues of fairness and equity, especially across generations (Shively, 
2002).  
 
Various descriptive scholars argue that selecting a social discount rate that is (substantially) 
lower than the market interest rate would leave future generations worse off, because a low rate 
diverts financial resources from better use, creating an inefficient allocation of funds (Azar, 2007; 
Nordhaus, 2007). Moreover, descriptivists criticize prescriptive approach supporters, charging 
them of elitism (e.g., Anthoff et al., 2009). They argue that prescriptivists impose their 
discounting views on society, even if society does not agree with these views (Baum, 2009). 
Conversely, the descriptive approach is often justified on grounds that it uses a description of 
how society discounts instead of having analysts impose their own discounting views on society 
(Baum, 2009). Baum (2009) notes, however, that while the descriptive approach to discounting 
can claim to discount according to a description of how society discounts, the approach cannot 
claim to have avoided injecting its values into the analysis. As discussed, analysts need to make a 
value judgment when choosing whether public discount rates or private discount rates are 
relevant when determining the social discount rate. When analysts choose for the latter option, 
they need to choose from the various market rates that are available.  
3.2 The implications of risk and uncertainty 
As well as determining the starting percentage rate for the risk-free discount rate (i.e. the risk-free 
discount rate in year 1), the term structure of the discount rate8 also needs to be determined. 
Among a significant number of scholars in the field there is strong consensus that the risk-free 
discount rate should decline over time (e.g., Atkinson and Mourato, 2008; Arrow et al., 2014; 
Boardman et al., 2013). The most prominent rationale for a declining risk-free discount rate is that 
the large uncertainty associated with aggregate consumption in the distant future (parameter ‘g’ 
in the Ramsey equation) should induce the prudent representative agent to use lower rates to 
discount more distant cash flows (Gollier, 2012b). It is often suggested in existing literature that 
economic agents are time inconsistent if the term structure of the discount rate is decreasing. 
According to Gollier (2012a) this is not the case, as long as the consumer’s rate of time preference 
(p) is constant. Arrow et al. (2014) argue that time inconsistency can be eliminated when 
estimates of the discount rate are regularly updated.   
 
                                                        
8 The term structure of the discount rate can be defined as the curvature of the discount rate. When the discount 
rate diminishes over time, the term structure is decreasing, and the term structure of the discount rate is flat when 
the discount rate does not change over time.  
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Once the decision about the risk-free discount rate has been made, practices then have to decide 
whether they would prefer to discount risky projects using a higher discount rate or discount 
these projects using the risk-free discount rate, and then communicate the project’s risks to the 
decision-maker in another way. The argument in existing literature (e.g., Damodaram, 2008; 
Gollier, 2012a) for discounting risky project effects with a higher discount rate is grounded in the 
observation that people are risk averse and therefore prefer certain, rather than uncertain, future 
effects. In existing literature, there is a consensus that only non-diversifiable risks should be 
considered in the discounting policy of Cost-Benefit Analyses (e.g., Arrow and Lind, 1970; 
Damodaram, 2008; Gollier, 2012a). Non-diversifiable risk is the risk of the project that cannot be 
diversified away, since it correlates with the aggregate risk (also coined as the macro-economic 
risk) of the government portfolio. Risks that can be fully diversified away in the government 
portfolio are not relevant for establishing the discounting policy, since adding the risk to the 
portfolio does not increase its riskiness (Arrow and Lind, 1970). Moreover, there is a consensus in 
current literature that a project’s non-diversifiable risks can correlate with the aggregate risk, in 
both a positive and a negative way. In the case of positive correlation, the risk premium is 
positive and in the case of a negative correlation, implementing the project reduces the aggregate 
risk. It therefore has an insurance value, which takes the form of a negative risk premium 
(Gollier, 2012a).  
 
In addition, scholars agree that risks should not be double counted in discounting policies. 
However, according to Damodaram (2008) it is all too common for public or private actors to 
double – or even triple – count risk in simulations and base decisions upon the wrong type of 
risk. Moreover, Damodaram (2008) states that it is important that risk is not double counted, 
since it is patently unfair to risky investments to discount their cash flows back at a risk-adjusted 
rate and to then reject them because the variability in value is high.  
 
One aspect of discounting policies on which leading scholars disagree is the term structure of the 
risk premium in the discount rate. Gollier (2012b) argues that the same arguments proposed in 
scientific literature to justify a decreasing term structure for the risk-free discount rate – 
parametric uncertainty of consumption growth (parameter g) – also justify an increasing term 
structure for the risk premium. In contrast, Weitzman (2012) argues that the risk premium should 
be declining, reflecting the increasing relative value of having insurance against the increasingly 
likely possibility over time of disastrous outcomes. Finally, the Capital Asset Pricing Model – 
which is heavily criticized in existing literature (e.g., Gollier, 2012b; Hagen et al., 2012) – assumes 
that the term structure of the risk premium is flat.  
3.3 The process of selecting discount rates  
The way discount rates are actually established is rarely discussed in existing literature. 
However, there are two noticeable exceptions. Firstly, Henderson and Bateman’s paper (1995, p. 
415), which concludes that: “the discount rate for a given project or project sector has never been a 
question determined through a rigorous calculus, but rather it has been an issue played out within and 
between branches of government, occasionally surfacing as an explicit political decision.” Henderson and 
Bateman discuss various examples of processes in which the discounting policies are the result of 
political bargaining, discretionary judgment and narrow interest group manipulation. Secondly, 
Groom and Hepburn (2017) analyze the conditions under which one particular advance in the 
theory of discounting (declining discount rates) found its way into policy. They conclude that 
three factors affect the successful implementation of declining discount rates in countries such as 
the United Kingdom and France: 1) the presence of economic ideas of high quality. Government 
“gatekeepers” must find the ideas “persuasive enough” so that policy makers can feel confident 
that the academic work is “sound”. Here, the perceived reputation/quality of academics is as 
important as the quality of their work; 2) there must be strong (political) demand for the ideas. 
That is, the implementation of the high quality ideas must be lucrative for influential policy 
makers; 3) key personalities (policy brokers) are needed who help to overcome political, 
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intellectual, and even administrative barriers that can prevent implementation of this scientific 
innovation.   
4. Results: the discounting policies of five countries 
This section describes the discounting policies of the five countries selected, including the 
rationales and arguments that are used to underpin the discounting policies. The description of 
the Dutch, British, Norwegian and Swedish discounting policies are largely based on the 
country’s appraisal guidelines and related documents. Interviews were primarily used to 
generate complementary insights into the underpinning of the discounting policies in these 
countries. The description of the Danish practice is fully based on statements made by 
respondents in the interviews, since no English language document describing the Danish 
discounting policy was available. The absence of such a document clarifies why the Danish 
country description is relatively short.       
4.1 The Netherlands 
The Dutch Discount Rate Working Group (2015) recommends a risk-free discount rate of 0% and 
a general risk-adjusted discount rate for the appraisal of government projects of 3%. The Working 
Group recommends a higher risk-adjusted discount rate of 4.5% for physical public investment 
projects with substantial fixed costs (e.g., transport infrastructure projects).  
 
The Working Group adopts ‘the opportunity cost of capital’ approach as the key theoretical 
framework to establish the discount rate. The main rationale for the risk-free discount rate of 0% 
is that long-term interest rates had fallen to approximately 0% at the time when the Working 
Group drafted their recommendation. Moreover, the general risk-adjusted discount rate of 3% 
was estimated on the basis of the required returns on a broad portfolio of investments in the 
economy. Although the Working Group adopts ‘the opportunity cost of capital’ approach as the 
key theoretical framework, it argues that the recommended general risk-adjusted discount rate of 
3% can also be defended from a ‘social rate of time preference’ point of view (‘consumption 
behavior approach’). The Working Group observes that using the Ramsey equation, discount 
rates ranging between 1% and 6% can be defended, as a result of uncertainty concerning the 
parameters of the Ramsey equation. For instance, the Working Group identifies empirical 
arguments in current literature for a 2% rate of pure time preference, and ethical arguments for a 
0% rate of pure time preference. Moreover, the Working Group establishes that the analysis of the 
ranges of discount rates that can be defended using the Ramsey equation provides additional 
support for the general discount rate of 3%, inferred by the opportunity cost of capital approach, 
because the 3% is right in the middle of the bandwidth of discount rates that can be defended 
using the Ramsey equation. Respondents confirmed that ethical arguments were discussed 
within the Working Group, but in the end the discount rate was underpinned using empirical 
arguments. One respondent argued that the Working Group’s decision was grounded in 
empirical arguments because they aspired to make a value-neutral choice regarding the discount 
rate. According to this interviewee it is up to politicians, and not academics, to make ethical 
decisions. A second respondent argued that ethical considerations only matter when establishing 
discount rates for the evaluation of government policies which clearly affect future generations 
(e.g., decisions concerning the size of the national debt and climate change policies). In this 
respondent’s view, one can safely use an empirically-based discount rate for the evaluation of 
transport projects that do not significantly affect future generations.     
 
The Working Group explains the higher discount rate for transport projects (4.5%) through 
arguing that the fixed costs make the net benefits of a project more sensitive to fluctuations in 
usage and they are therefore riskier in economic terms than an average government project. 
However, why a discount rate of 4.5% for transport projects was selected – instead of a discount 
EJTIR 18(4), 2018, pp.389-412  398 
Mouter  
A critical assessment of discounting policies for transport Cost-Benefit Analysis in five European practices 
 
rate of 3.5% or 5.5%, for instance – was not clarified in the recommendation. Interviews with 
members of the Working Group confirmed that a thorough foundation for the use of a 4.5% 
discount rate is currently lacking. One respondent stated that the main cause of this was time 
pressure. Because fundamental discussions regarding discounting policies required a lot of time, 
concrete decisions regarding the level of the discount rate were made in the face of tight 
deadlines. A second respondent argued that the selection of the 4.5% discount rate was a 
pragmatic decision. From a theoretical point of view it would have been better to discount the 
benefits of transport projects with an even higher discount rate and discount the costs with the 
standard premium of 3%. Two respondents argued that 4.5% was considered to be a reasonable 
number, which needs to be investigated in future research.       
 
The Working Group acknowledges that they have taken note of the scientific debate on the 
question as to whether the term structure of the discount rate should be downward sloping. 
However, the Working Group recommends a flat term structure, giving four reasons: 1) Gollier 
(2012b) argues that the same arguments proposed in scientific literature to justify a decreasing 
term structure for the risk-free discount rate – parametric uncertainty of consumption growth 
(parameter g) – also justifies an increasing term structure for the risk premium. Hence, the risk-
adjusted discount rate may be constant; 2) the risk-free discount rate is already very low (0%) and 
lower than what is considered to be appropriate for long maturities in the climate discussion; 3) a 
flat discount rate is easier to apply in practice; 4) the issue of a declining discount rate is 
particularly relevant for climate projects and the Working Group has chosen to incorporate 
uncertainty concerning climate costs and benefits in CBAs through scenario analysis.  
 
Another feature of the Dutch discounting policy is that macro-economic risk is not only handled 
via the discount rate, but also through estimating a project’s costs and benefits for at least two 
future macro-economic scenarios. The key argument for handling macro-economic risk through 
both the discount rate and scenario-analysis is that scenarios are useful to identify uncertainty. 
Interestingly, a previous CBA guideline (Dutch Ministry of Finance and CPB, 2003) concluded 
that CBA analysts should either estimate the effects of a project using scenarios that differ in 
macro-economic growth, or adjust the discount rate for macro-economic risk, to avoid double 
counting. The directive to choose for either incorporating macro-economic risk via a risk 
premium in the discount rate, or to capture it via scenario analysis was endorsed by de Zeeuw et 
al. (2008). Respondents confirmed that the combination of scenario analysis and a risk-adjusted 
discount rate is still an unresolved, precarious issue. According to two respondents, there are 
good arguments to adopt a risk-adjusted discount rate and omit scenario analysis, but 
conducting scenario analysis is a valued tradition in the Dutch practice of policy analysis which 
cannot be easily overruled. Scenario analysis is prescribed in various CBA Guidelines 
(Eijgenraam et al., 2000; Koopmans, 2004; Romijn and Renes, 2013) and the importance of 
conducing scenario analysis is emphasized in various evaluations of the Dutch CBA practice 
(Annema et al., 2007; Beukers et al., 2012; Mouter et al., 2015).    
4.2 United Kingdom  
In UK practice, the Green Book (Treasury of the United Kingdom, 2003) establishes that the costs 
and benefits are discounted using a declining discount rate (3.5% for the period of 0-30 years, 3% 
for the period of 31-75 years and 2.5% for the period of 76-125 years). The Green Book discusses 
how the ‘consumption behavior approach’, expressed through the Ramsey rule, is used as a 
framework to derive the 3.5% discount rate for the period of 0-30 years. According to the Green 
Book, evidence suggests a pure rate of time preference (p) of around 1.5%, an annual growth in 
per capita consumption of around 2% and elasticity of marginal utility of consumption at around 
1. The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption is derived from Pearce and Ulph (1999), 
amongst others, estimating a range from 0.7 - 1.5 and Oxera (2002), estimating a range from 0.8 to 
1.1. The key references used to underpin the rationale for declining discount rates are discussed 
in the Oxera (2002) report.  
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In the past, the British discount rate included a risk premium. However, it was concluded during 
the revision that it was a better solution to address relevant risk specifically for each project 
through various risk analysis methods, such as quantified risk analysis (Hagen et al., 2012). The 
Green Book assumes that, given the size of national income relative to the scale of most 
individual projects, the cost of variability of individual projects is usually negligible (Treasury 
United Kingdom, 2003). Hagen et al. (2012) observe that this claim is not underpinned with 
specific reasons or references. Two British respondents state that this is a serious issue. One 
respondent states that the treatment of risk in the UK practice is ‘very unsatisfactorily’ and ‘not 
really sophisticated’. Another respondent (an academic) thinks that macro-economic risk should 
be considered in appraisal and that academics should push for more sophisticated analysis.  
4.3 Norway 
The Hagen et al. (2012) committee recommends a risk-free discount rate of 2.5% for the first 40 
years and a risk-free discount rate of 2% after 40 years. To determine the discount rate, leading 
scholars on this topic were invited to discuss the state-of-the-art literature with the Hagen et al. 
(2012) committee. The committee concluded – referring to Gollier (2008) and Weitzman (1998), 
for instance – that a strong argument has been put forward in existing literature for applying a 
declining risk-free discount rate. Moreover, Hagen et al. (2012, p.61) concluded that existing 
literature did not give a firm answer to the question as to what the risk-free discount rate should 
be: “Different estimates and assumptions as to the parameter values included in the Ramsey condition may 
produce very different estimates as to the required rate of return. Harrison (2010) shows that different 
sources arrive at required rates of return that range from 1.4 percent to 8 percent…. This illustrates that 
there is no straightforward answer to what is an appropriate discount rate when using this simple 
approach.” Hence, it was decided to use ‘opportunity cost of capital’ as the theoretical framework 
to decide upon the discount rate (Hagen et al., 2012, p.77): “There is no one correct way of providing 
specific estimates for the risk-free market interest rate, the risk premium and the time profile of interest rate 
developments. However, a reasonable approach may be to assume that it will, under normal market 
conditions, be possible to secure a risk-free real interest rate of 2.5 percent within a time span of 40 years 
through investments in the international financial market.” One respondent endorsed that the risk-
free discount rate was (partly) based on judgment: “We did have some clues about what the level 
approximately should be. But the theory did not give us clear answers regarding the level of the discount 
rate. Partly it came out of thin air.” 
 
Hagen et al. (2012, p.68) recommended that projects should be discounted using a standard risk-
adjusted discount rate, since the outcome of the former regime – estimating the specific risk-
adjustment for individual projects – was only followed in a small number of cases, resulting in 
major projects being discounted at the risk-free discount rate, which was evaluated as 
undesirable. Moreover, the committee concluded that for determining the risk premium in the 
discount rate, the CAPM was no longer useful, arguing, amongst other things, that the model 
assumes that all assets are tradable and have a market price, whilst large parts of national wealth 
are not tradable and that the model failed to predict how investors act and how financial markets 
work. Since it was decided not to use the CAPM for determining the risk premium, the Hagen et 
al. (2012, p.70) committee searched through existing literature for an alternative solution and 
established a declining term structure of the risk premium, sustaining their argument in a 
discussion paper by Weitzman (2012). Hagen et al. (2012) assume that a transportation measure 
has a risk profile that is somewhat closer to a government bond than to an average project funded 
via the stock exchange and conclude that a risk-adjusted real required rate of return on 
government bonds of 4% is reasonable. Consequently, the committee recommended a discount 
rate of 4% for the first 40 years (2.5% risk-free and 1.5% risk premium), a discount rate of 3% for 
years 41 – 75 (2% risk-free and 1% risk premium) and after 75 years a risk-free discount rate of 2% 
should be used.  
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4.4 Sweden 
In the 2012 revision of the Swedish ASEK Guidelines (Swedish Transport Administration, 2012),9 
the advisory group of scientific experts recommended that the discount rate should remain at 4%, 
but the Director General of the National Transport Administration decided to reduce it to 3.5% 
(Hultkrantz et al., 2014). Consequently, the Guidelines (Swedish Transport Administration, 2012, 
p. 9) recommend using a social discount rate of 3.5%, arguing that although there are many 
different views on what the size of the social rate of discount should be, there is a consensus that 
the Ramsey model should be used as a starting point for determining the discount rate. 
Subsequently, the discount rate can be determined by estimating the parameters in the Ramsey 
equation. The ASEK Guidelines state that it is reasonable to make the same assumptions for the 
consumer’s rate of time preference and the numerical value of the elasticity of marginal utility of 
consumption as those shown the British Green Book (Treasury United Kingdom, 2003) and the 
European HEATCO recommendations (HEATCO, 2006). The third parameter in the Ramsey 
equation – the relative consumption growth per capita – was estimated using the projected 
annual growth in GNP per capita (about 1.8% until 2050). Based on the Ramsey model, a discount 
rate of 3.28% was estimated (Hagen et al., 2012).  
 
The ASEK Guidelines outline that, although there are scientific arguments for using a declining 
social discount rate (e.g., Weitzman, 2001 and Gollier, 2002), Sweden works with a constant 
discount rate, since using a declining discount rate leads to practical complications, as the 
modelling tools used for CBA are not designed to handle variable discount rates. Moreover, the 
Guidelines state that macro-economic risk may be an argument for a higher discount rate, 
compared to the rate determined by the Ramsey equation. Based on the estimation using the 
Ramsey equation, as well as discussions about risks and declining discount rates, a flat discount 
rate of 3.5% was established (Swedish Transport Administration, 2012). Because it is not clear to 
which extent arguments prevailing in scientific literature concerning the inclusion of macro-
economic risk and a declining risk-free rate affected the selection of the discount rate, it can be 
concluded that these arguments were not explicitly considered in the Swedish discounting 
policy. However, because these arguments were part of the discussions which preceded the 
selection of the discount rate, it can be established that the Swedish discounting policy implicitly 
incorporates arguments in the literature concerning the inclusion of macro-economic risk and a 
declining risk-free discount rate. Finally, interviews revealed that another argument for using a 
flat discount rate in CBAs for transport projects is that the time horizon of CBAs for Swedish 
transport projects is 40 years (Olsson et al., 2012), and a declining risk-free discount rate will not, 
or will only marginally, affect the economic evaluation of projects with such horizons.  
4.5 Denmark 
The discount rate is determined by the Minister of Finance. Quite recently the discount rate was 
reduced to 4% (3% risk-free and 1% risk premium). Also, it was decided that the discount rate 
should decline after 35 years and 70 years. After 35 years, costs and benefits should be discounted 
at a rate of 3% (2.5% risk-free and 0.5% risk premium), and after 70 years costs and benefits 
should be discounted with a risk-free rate of 2%. The decision to adopt a declining discount rate 
was influenced by the recommendations of the Hagen committee. The arguments and rationales 
used by this committee were ‘transplanted’ into the Danish practice (see section 4.3 for a 
discussion of the arguments). 
4.6 Respondents’ reflections on the process of selecting discounting policies   
Apart from obtaining complementary insights into rationales and arguments for discounting 
policies, respondents were also asked to reflect on the process of deciding upon the discounting 
policy in their country, as well as its merits. Interviews with Swedish and Danish respondents, in 
                                                        
9 The ASEK Guidelines were revised in 2018 (Swedish Transport Administration, 2018). These Guidelines provide 
the same recommendations.  
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particular, provided new perspectives, since they observed that the applied discount rate in their 
country is predominantly an outcome of a political-administrative process and not of an 
impartial scientific exercise. Below, these observations are discussed in more detail.  
 
Three respondents stated that in Sweden the discount rate is not centrally determined by the 
Ministry of Finance. After a discussion with other Administrations (such as the Environmental 
Administration), at the end of the day it was the Director General of the Transport 
Administration who decided on the discount rate which should be used in CBAs for the transport 
sector. According to the respondents, the Director General selected the lowest possible discount 
rate that he could reasonably justify, since he realized that the CBA results for infrastructure 
projects are enhanced when a low discount rate is used. One Swedish respondent stated the 
following: “my concern is that the decision about the parameters is taken by the Director General of the 
Transport Administration. I don’t question him as an individual but the fact that the decisions on the 
parameters are actually taken by people with interests in the results of CBA studies is not very good, I 
think”.  
 
Four Danish respondents emphasized the political character of the decision about the discount 
rate in their practice. The Minister of Finance decided upon the rate, after tough negotiations. 
According to one respondent, the Ministry of Finance was reluctant to reduce the discount rate 
(which used to be 6%), since from their point of view, money is best kept in the Treasury and a 
low discount rate potentially enhances the CBA scores of many projects, which gives project 
proponents an argument to fund the project. However, in the media, people argued that discount 
rates should be lowered for three reasons. Firstly, the real interest rate was lower than zero. 
Secondly, as a result of the high discount rate, no projects aimed at mitigating climate change 
(e.g., subsidizing electric vehicles) were viable. Thirdly, the Great Belt Company had government 
secured loans and had borrowed money at 1.5-2% for many years. One respondent stated that in 
the coalition agreement between the three government parties, it was stated that they should take 
a look at the discount rate, and there was huge pressure on the Ministry of Finance to lower the 
rate.  
 
In conclusion, both Danish and Swedish respondents emphasized the fact that political-
administrative bargaining processes play a vital role in the establishment of the applied discount 
rate in their practice. Discounting policies were established after negotiations between actors 
preferring a low discount rate (e.g., the Swedish Transport Administration) – since this results in 
their projects performing better in CBAs – and the Ministry of Finance, which favors a high 
discount rate – since this will lead to low CBA scores and, accordingly, a better argument to keep 
money in the Treasury. Moreover, respondents discussed the fact that political-administrative 
negotiations are both fueled and restricted by empirical observations. Danish respondents argued 
that the discussion about the discount rate catalyzed after it was discovered that the real interest 
rate was significantly lower than the existing risk-free discount rate. Hence, a situation in which 
the results from empirical observations or (academic) studies dispute the soundness of the 
existing discount rate, is perfect soil for a reopening of a bargaining process to adjust the discount 
rate. Besides fueling debate on the discount rate, empirical observations also set the boundaries 
for the ‘discounting policy bargaining process’. For instance, from the analysis of the Swedish 
practice it can be seen that the Director General of the Transport Administration selected the 
lowest possible discount rate that he could reasonably justify. The observation that bargaining 
processes may influence discounting policies is covered in the literature (Henderson and 
Bateman, 1995), but the fact that these processes can be restricted by empirical observations is a 
new insight. The observation that bargaining processes are not only fueled by academic 
advances, but also by empirical observations complements the results of Groom and Hepburn 
(2017).  
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The Dutch respondents established that the discounting policy was not – or was only to a limited 
extent – affected by political-administrative mechanisms. The discussion in the Working Group 
particularly focused on discussions regarding contrasting insights within academic literature. 
One respondent stated that an additional meeting was planned to discuss arguments which 
underpin the higher discount rate for transport projects, because affiliates from the Ministry of 
Transport were not amused by this. However, respondents perceived that, even at this meeting, 
the discussion focused on arguments conveyed in existing scientific literature.   
5. Assessment of the five practices    
This section provides a critical assessment, through analyzing the rationales and arguments that 
are used for underpinning the discounting policies in the five practices. Section 5.1 discusses the 
differences between the discounting policies of the five countries. Section 5.2 analyzes the 
arguments and rationales used for underpinning the discounting policies in the five practices, for 
instance, by addressing the way rationales offered in existing literature (see section 3) are 
translated into the practices.     
5.1 Differences between discounting policies 
To begin with, Table 2 provides an overview of the characteristics of the discounting policies. The 
second and the third row show the risk-free discount rate and the way macro-economic risk is 
handled in the discounting policies of the five practices. The discount rate schedule is presented 
in the fourth row. To provide an indication of what the differences in discounting policies mean 
for CBA results, the final rows present the net present value and the benefit-cost ratio of a 
hypothetical transport project with 1.4 billion of construction costs and net yearly benefits of 70 
million. These final indicators are calculated for a time horizon of 40 years (the shortest time 
horizon of the five countries - Sweden) and 100 years (the longest time horizon of the five 
countries - the Netherlands).   
 
Table 2:  Characteristics of discounting policies for the five practices 
 
 Netherlands United 
Kingdom 
Norway Sweden Denmark 
What is the 
(declining or 
constant) risk-
free discount 
rate?  
Constant risk-
free discount 
rate of 0% 
Declining risk-
free discount 
rate: 
 
3.5%: years 0-30 
3%: years 31-75 
2.5%: years 76+ 
Declining risk-
free discount 
rate  
 
2.5%: years 0-40 
2%: years 41+  
Constant risk-
free discount 
rate of 3.5%. 
However, 
arguments for a 
declining 
discount rate 
are implicitly 
considered  
Declining risk-
free discount 
rate 
 
3%: years 0-35 
2.5%: years 36-
70 
2%: years 71+  
Is macro-
economic risk 
incorporated in 
the discount 
rate? 
Constant 
standard risk 
premium of 
4.5%, also 
macro-economic 
risk is handled 
via scenarios  
Macro-
economic risk is 
not handled 
through the 
discount rate 
Declining 
standard risk 
premium is 
incorporated in 
the discount 
rate 
 
1.5%: years 0-40 
1%: years 41-75 
Macro-
economic risk is 
not explicitly 
handled 
through the 
discount rate 
but is implicitly 
considered in 
the discounting 
policy 
Declining 
standard risk 
premium is 
incorporated 
in the discount 
rate 
 
1%: years 0-35 
0.5%: years 36-
70  
What is the 4.5% for the full 3.5%: years 0-30 4%: years 0-40 3.5% for the full 4%: years 0-35 
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discount rate 
schedule?  
time horizon 3%: years 31-75 
2.5%: years 76+ 
3%: years 41-75 
2%: years 76+ 
time horizon 3%: years 36-
70 
2%: years 71+ 
NPV/BCR for a 
project with 
costs of 1.4 
billion and 
yearly benefits 
of 70 million 
(40 years) 
NPV:  
-42 million 
 
BCR: 
0.97 
NPV:  
+166 million 
 
BCR: 
1.19 
NPV:  
+ 55 million 
 
BCR: 
1.04 
NPV:  
+164 million 
 
BCR: 
1.18 
NPV:  
+56  million 
 
BCR: 
1.04 
NPV/BCR for a 
project with 
costs of 1.4 
billion and 
yearly benefits 
of 70 million 
(100 years) 
NPV:  
+206 million 
 
BCR: 
1.15 
NPV:  
+678 million 
 
BCR: 
1.48 
NPV:  
+456 million  
 
BCR: 
1.33 
NPV:  
+606 million 
 
BCR: 
1.43 
NPV:  
+505 million 
 
BCR: 
1.36 
 
Table 2 shows that the resulting discount rate schedules (fourth row) for the Scandinavian 
countries and the United Kingdom appear to be rather similar. However, based on the calculation 
of the net present value of the fictive project (final rows), it is possible to conclude that the 
(relatively small) differences in discount rate schedules substantially affect net present values. 
Moreover, it can be concluded that the discount rate schedule applied in the Netherlands 
deviates from the other countries, which has a substantial effect on net present values.  
 
Table 2 also shows that the discounting policies vary substantially between the countries. These 
are the three most significant differences: Firstly, the discounting policies differ with respect to 
incorporating macro-economic risk into the discount rate. In the United Kingdom risk is not 
handled through the discount rate, in Sweden risk is only handled implicitly, and both Norway 
and Denmark apply a declining risk premium, which commences at a rate of 1.5% (Norway) or 
1% (Denmark), whereas in the Netherlands risk is handled through a risk-adjusted discount rate 
of 4.5%. The second component where discounting policies significantly differ is the starting 
percentage of the risk-free discount rate (the risk-free discount rate in year 1). The discount rate 
schedules in the United Kingdom and Sweden start with a higher risk-free discount rate than in 
the other countries. Thirdly, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway apply a declining risk-
free discount rate, whereas Sweden considers the arguments for a declining discount rate only 
implicitly in their discounting policy, and the Netherlands does not apply a declining risk-free 
discount rate. 
5.2 Assessment of arguments and rationales used for underpinning discounting policies    
Because the key aim of this paper is to analyze how the rationales and arguments for 
underpinning discounting policies provided in existing literature are translated in five practices, 
Table 3 outlines the prevailing arguments in the literature for underpinning specific components 
of discounting policies, as well as the arguments that are used in the five practices. Four types of 
arguments are distinguished: 1) empirical arguments; 2) judgments based on inconclusive 
empirical evidence: when empirical evidence does not provide a definite answer, one needs to 
make a discretionary choice, based on the inconclusive empirical evidence; 3) unspecified 
judgments: a discretionary decision is made without any specific references to empirical evidence 
and/or ethical considerations; 4) practical arguments. 
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Table 3:  Arguments for discounting policies, distinguished by their nature 
 
Arguments 
underpinning 
the starting 
percentage of 
the risk-free 
discount rate  
Literature: 
-Both the ‘consumption behavior’ and ‘opportunity cost of capital’ approaches are justifiable 
theoretical frameworks for determining a risk-free discount rate, but the former is prevalent 
(e.g., Arrow et al., 2013).    
Netherlands (0%): 
-Opportunity cost of capital approach. The real interest rate observed in financial markets is 
used as a starting point (empirical) 
United Kingdom (3.5%): 
-Consumption behavior approach. Risk-free discount rate is based on the results of (academic) 
studies, which provide ranges for the parameters of the Ramsey equation (judgment based on 
inconclusive empirical evidence) 
Norway (2.5%): 
Opportunity cost of capital approach. No one correct way of providing specific estimates for 
the risk-free market interest rate. A reasonable approach seems to be to assume a 2.5% risk-free 
discount rate, based on the return in international markets (judgment based on inconclusive 
empirical evidence) 
Sweden (3.5%): 
-Consumption behavior approach. Reasonable to make the same assumptions as UK and 
HEATCO for estimating two parameters in the Ramsey equation (p and μ) (judgment based on 
inconclusive empirical evidence) 
-Relative consumption growth, based on projected annual GDP growth (empirical) 
Denmark (3%):  
-Opportunity cost of capital approach. The recommendations of the Norwegian Hagen 
committee were ‘transplanted’ into Danish practice. These recommendations resulted from 
judgment based on inconclusive empirical evidence. (judgment based on inconclusive 
empirical evidence) 
Arguments 
underpinning 
the decision 
to use a 
constant or 
declining 
risk-free 
discount rate.  
Literature: 
-Consensus that the risk-free discount rate should decline over time (e.g., Atkinson and 
Mourato, 2008; Arrow et al., 2014; Boardman et al., 2013). 
Netherlands (constant): 
-Constant risk-adjusted discount rate, underpinned with academic literature. Arguments in the 
literature for a declining risk-free discount rate justify an increasing term structure for the risk 
premium (Gollier, 2012b). Hence, the prescription in the scientific literature to use a declining 
risk-free discount rate can result in a prescription of a constant risk-adjusted discount rate 
(empirical) 
-A constant discount rate is easier to apply in practice (practical) 
United Kingdom (declining):  
Declining discount rate, underpinned with academic literature (empirical) 
Norway (declining): 
Declining discount rate, underpinned with academic literature (empirical) 
Sweden (constant): 
-Modelling tools used for CBA are not designed to handle variable discount rates (practical) 
-Discount rate was determined, based on discussions about risks and a declining discount rate 
(unspecified judgment) 
-It doesn’t matter (much) if the discount rate is flat or declining (much), for the economic 
evaluation of projects with a time horizon of 40 years (practical)  
Denmark (declining):  
-The recommendations of the Norwegian Hagen committee were ‘transplanted’ into Danish 
practice. These recommendations were based on empirical evidence. (empirical) 
Arguments 
underpinning 
the decision 
to incorporate 
a premium 
for  macro-
economic risk 
in the 
discount rate 
(or not) 
Literature: 
-Only non-diversifiable risks should be considered in discounting policies (e.g., Arrow and 
Lind, 1970; Damodaram, 2008; Gollier, 2012a). 
-Risks should not be double counted (e.g., Damodaram, 2008) 
-Leading scholars disagree on whether the term structure of the risk premium should be 
increasing or decreasing (Gollier, 2012b; Weitzman, 2012).   
Netherlands (4.5%): 
-General risk-adjusted discount rate of 3%, based on the required returns of a broad portfolio 
of investments in the economy (empirical) 
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-Transport projects discounted by 4.5% because the net benefits of transport projects are more 
sensitive to fluctuations in usage. But it is not clear why 4.5% was used (unspecified judgment) 
-Aggregate risk is handled within the Dutch discounting policy through both a ‘risk-adjusted 
discount rate’ and ‘macro-economic scenario analysis’ (unspecified judgment) 
United Kingdom (0%): 
-Given the size of the national income, the contribution of an individual project to the macro-
economic risk seems to be negligible (unspecified judgment) 
Norway (1.5% years 0-40, 1% year 41-75): 
-Risk premium based on academic literature (empirical) 
Sweden: 
-The discount rate was determined, based on discussions about risks and a declining discount 
rate (unspecified judgment) 
Denmark (1% years 0-35, 0.5% years 36-70):  
-The recommendations of the Norwegian Hagen committee were ‘transplanted’ into Danish 
practice. These recommendations were based on empirical evidence. (empirical) 
 
To begin with, Table 3 shows that all practices adopt a descriptive approach in the sense that an 
attempt is made to fully substantiate the discount rate in the actual behavior of individuals via 
the two theoretical frameworks: ‘opportunity cost of capital’ or ‘consumption behavior approach’ 
(first row). Most of the empirical arguments that are used to underpin discounting policies are in 
line with what is already reported in existing literature. However, in two cases the arguments 
seem to contradict this literature. Firstly, non-diversifiable risk is not incorporated in the UK 
discounting policy, since it was argued that non-diversifiable risk is usually negligible for 
individual projects. Both Hagen et al. (2012) and Hultkrantz et al. (2014) observe that this claim is 
not underpinned with specific reasons or references. The UK policy is convincing for marginal 
projects but seems to be difficult to defend for multi-billion projects, such as High-Speed 2. As a 
result of the project’s size, it is not obvious that all the risks can be diversified away. Although 
various risks were thoroughly analyzed in the Economic Case for High Speed 2 (DfT, 2013) the 
project’s contribution to the macro-economic risk wasn’t investigated. Hence, not incorporating 
risk via the discount rate probably means that the CBA results for projects that contribute heavily 
to the aggregate risk might be too optimistic. Secondly, even though literature prescribes that 
risks should not be double counted (e.g., Damodaram, 2008), aggregate risk is handled in the 
Dutch discounting policy through both a ‘risk-adjusted discount rate’ and ‘macro-economic 
scenario analysis’. In Norway and Denmark a ‘risk-adjusted discount rate’ and ‘sensitivity 
analysis’ are combined. When macro-economic risk is handled through these sensitivity analyses, 
it is conceivable that macro-economic risk is also double counted in these practices. The 
observation that in two cases empirical arguments seem to contradict with the prevailing 
literature was an unexpected result of this study, considering the emphasis in the guidelines to 
base the discount rate on empirical information, and the observation of several scholars that the 
five countries included in this study have a serious CBA track record (e.g., Mackie and Worsley, 
2013). 
 
Table 3 also provides insights into underlying explanations for the differences between the 
discounting policies identified in Table 1. Table 2 shows that the starting percentages of the risk-
free discount rates applied in the five practices are underpinned with empirical arguments and 
judgments based on inconclusive empirical evidence. Hence, it is conceivable that differences 
between risk-free discount rates can be explained by both empirical characteristics (e.g., the real 
interest rate differs between country A and country B) and by differences in judgments made 
(e.g., which risk-free discount rate is selected, based on the inconclusive empirical evidence?). 
Practical reasons explain why Sweden, unlike the United Kingdom, Norway and Denmark, does 
not use a declining discount rate. The Swedish modelling tools used for CBA are not designed to 
handle variable discount rates. Moreover, the urgency of rectifying this practical obstacle is 
relatively low because, due to the 40-year time horizon, the impact of using a flat or declining 
discount rate is rather low. Dutch Guidelines use both arguments derived from scientific 
literature and practical arguments to specify why a constant discount rate is used instead of a 
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declining discount rate. Both empirical arguments and differences in judgment explain why 
countries have different policies with respect to handling risk in the discount rate. Based on 
unspecified judgment, the United Kingdom and Sweden decided not to handle risk through the 
discount rate. The Dutch Working Group’s recommendation to use a 4.5% risk premium for 
discounting the effects of transport projects does not provide any references to empirical 
evidence. Because the Dutch and the British practices underpin (part of) their decision to (not) 
incorporate macro-economic risk without any specific references to empirical evidence and/or 
ethical considerations, it is difficult to explain differences between these policies.  
 
In addition to the explanations listed above, Swedish and Danish respondents emphasized that 
political-administrative arguments played a vital role in establishing their discounting policies. 
Fostering political or administrative goals was identified as an underlying reason for decisions 
with respect to the discounting policies in these practices. However, respondents were not able to 
fully explain which components of the discount rate were (not) influenced by these negotiations. 
Nevertheless, for both practices it can be concluded that the applied discount rate is influenced 
by the relative power of institutions preferring a high discount rate compared to institutions 
preferring a low discount rate. An interesting feature of the political-administrative arguments is 
that they were not explicitly addressed in the guidelines.  
 
Arguments to derive the social discount rate from fundamental ethical views (e.g., Davidson, 
2006; Ramsey, 1928; Shively, 2002; Stern, 2008; van Liederkerke, 2004) were discussed in some of 
the guidelines. However, such prescriptive arguments did not seem to have an explicit role in the 
final underpinning of the discounting policies that this paper scrutinized. A statement along the 
lines of ‘for ethical reasons, we select discount rate X’ was not found in any CBA guideline and 
Stern’s suggestion (2008) to select discount rates based on thought experiments was not adopted 
in any of the practices. An underlying study, supporting the British discounting policy (Oxera, 
2002), outlines ethical arguments for applying a zero pure rate of time preference. However, the 
British Guidelines do not discuss these arguments explicitly (Treasury of the United Kingdom, 
2003; p.97): “other literature suggests it lies between 0.0 and 0.5. However, if zero, this implies pure time 
preference does not exist, which is not regarded as plausible”. In fact, the British Guidelines evade the 
ethical question as to whether a pure rate of time preference ‘ought’ to be included. Accordingly, 
this argument suffers from the “is-ought fallacy”, articulated by David Hume, which implies that 
just because something is a certain way, it does not necessarily mean that it ought to be that way. 
The Dutch Working Group establishes that ethical arguments exist for adopting a rate of pure 
time preference of 0%, but this argument does not seem to play a role in the final underpinning of 
the discounting policy, which is primarily grounded in the ‘opportunity cost of capital’ 
framework. One Dutch respondent argued that one can safely use an empirically-based discount 
rate for the evaluation of transport projects as ethical considerations only matter when 
establishing discount rates for the evaluation of government policies which clearly affect future 
generations (e.g., decisions concerning the size of the national debt and climate change policies). 
Another respondent argued that ethical arguments were discussed in the Dutch Discount Rate 
Working Group (2015). However, because the Working Group aspired to make a value-neutral 
choice regarding the discount rate, they decided to use empirical arguments instead of ethical 
arguments in the underpinning of the discounting policy. Most importantly, neither of the 
arguments presented by the Dutch respondents were addressed in the extensive report made by 
the Dutch Discount Rate Working Group (2015).  
6. Conclusions and discussion 
This study analyzes how the rationales and arguments for underpinning discounting policies 
provided by existing literature are translated into five practices: the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. This study observes that the five practices adopt a 
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descriptive approach in the sense that an attempt is made to fully substantiate the discount rate 
in the actual behavior of individuals. Prescriptive arguments to derive the social discount rate 
from fundamental ethical views are sometimes discussed in the guidelines, but these types of 
arguments did not seem to play a role in the final underpinning of discounting policies. Another 
observation is that although most of the empirical arguments underpinning discounting policies 
are in line with the literature, some of the arguments seem to contradict this existing literature. 
Bearing in mind the decisive impact of the discount rate on CBA outcomes, it is recommendable 
to critically assess and reconsider these arguments. 
 
Apart from empirical evidence, discounting policies in the five countries are based on judgmental 
arguments, political-administrative arguments and practical arguments. Practical arguments are 
used in the Dutch and Swedish practice to underpin the choice for a constant risk-free discount 
rate. Political-administrative bargaining processes between institutions preferring a high (low) 
discount rate particularly played a vital role in the establishment of the discount rate in Sweden 
and Denmark. One insight of our study, which hasn’t been seen before in existing literature, is 
that the political-administrative negotiations in these practices are both fueled and restricted by 
empirical observations. On the one hand, a situation in which results from empirical observations 
or (academic) studies dispute the soundness of the existing discount rate is perfect soil for the 
reopening of a bargaining process to adjust the discount rate. On the other hand, empirical 
observations also set the boundaries for the ‘discounting policy bargaining process’, as it is 
difficult for actors to argue in favor of a discount rate which they cannot reasonably justify, based 
on empirical evidence. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that ‘judgment’ plays a significant 
role in the establishment of discount rates. The fact that analysts inevitably need to make value 
judgments when selecting discount rates is well covered in existing literature (e.g., Baum, 2009; 
Boadway, 2006). However, a new insight of our study is that discounting policies are not only 
established based on ‘inevitable judgment’, but also on ‘unspecified judgment’. Decisions in the 
Swedish, Dutch and British practice regarding the incorporation of macro-economic risk in the 
discount rate were made in a discretionary way without any specific references to empirical 
evidence.  
 
Probably the most important conclusion of this study is that both the political-administrative 
arguments and the judgmental arguments are not – or are poorly – communicated in the 
guidelines of the five practices. The main problem resulting from this poor communication of the 
judgmental (and sometimes political) character of discount rates is that it is difficult for Members 
of Parliament and/or other actors and institutions who aspire to use CBA (from now on: CBA 
users) to decide whether they agree with the reasonableness of the judgments. When the 
judgmental aspects of the discount rate are not made explicit, this can prevent CBA users from 
assessing the judgments made, from disagreeing with these judgments and from asking for a 
recalculation of the CBA based on a discount rate which coincides with their own judgments. 
Another problem resulting from the poor communication of judgments is that it is difficult to 
learn from (the differences between) the five practices investigated in this study. To illustrate, 
because the Dutch and the British practice underpin their decision to (not) incorporate macro-
economic risk without any specific references to empirical evidence and/or ethical 
considerations, it is difficult for countries that aspire to institutionalize CBA to learn from these 
mature practices.   
 
The next question is: how can the communication of the judgmental character of discounting 
policies be improved? First and foremost, judgments should be made transparent. Below, we 
discuss four ways in which the transparency of the guidelines of the five practices can be 
improved. Although this discussion focuses on the five practices investigated in this study, we 
believe that these recommendations can be useful for other practices as well. The first 
recommendation is that practices who adopt a descriptive approach should make it clear why 
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they have adopted a descriptive, instead of a prescriptive approach. In the case of the 
Netherlands, members of the Working Group that are responsible for establishing the discount 
rate, discussed these arguments internally, but this discussion did not materialize in the 
guidelines. One respondent argued that the Working Group’s decision was grounded in 
empirical arguments, because they aspired to make a value-neutral choice about the discount 
rate. According to this interviewee it is up to politicians, and not academics, to make ethical 
decisions. However, because this critical decision did not materialize on paper, it is very difficult 
for politicians and other CBA users to be aware of the fact that it is even possible to determine the 
discount rate on prescriptive arguments that do not match market interest rates. The ambition of 
the Working Group to make a value-neutral choice when selecting the discount rate is also 
interesting because it contradicts Baum’s conclusion (2009) that analysts cannot avoid injecting 
their value judgments on the selection of the discount rate. Our second recommendation to 
analysts, who choose to adopt a descriptive approach when selecting a social discount rate is to 
make the arguments explicit that underpin the choice between using public discount rates (how 
does society think that the government should discount the impacts of public investments) or 
private discount rates (based on market behavior). Thirdly, when countries choose to determine 
the social discount rate based on private discount rates, it is recommended that they clearly 
communicate why one particular market rate has been selected from the multiple market rates 
that are available. For instance, in the Norwegian Guideline (Hagen et al., 2012, p. 77) the 
judgmental character of the selection of one market rate from the multitude of rates available is 
explicitly communicated: “there is no one correct way of providing specific estimates for the risk-free 
market interest rate, the risk premium and the time profile of interest rate developments. However, a 
reasonable approach may be to assume that it will, under normal market conditions, be possible to secure a 
risk-free real interest rate of 2.5 percent within a time span of 40 years through investments in the 
international financial market.” However, although the judgmental character of this decision is 
explicitly communicated, no additional arguments are provided to explain why the decision to 
select a 2.5 percent risk-free interest rate was more reasonable than another risk-free discount rate 
that could also be selected from the inconclusive empirical evidence. In this case, it is 
recommended that arguments are explicitly addressed to explain why a certain rate was selected 
in the guidelines. Fourthly, transparency can be improved by providing specific underpinnings, 
in case components of the discounting policy are based on discretionary decisions made without 
any specific references to empirical evidence and/or ethical considerations (unspecified 
judgments).10 Finally, academics who aspire to conduct research that would better equip 
practitioners to design discounting policies in the face of varying recommendations from the 
literature are encouraged to investigate how these four recommendations can be further 
specified.  
 
Apart from providing solid underpinnings for the judgements made when designing discounting 
policies, various scholars argue that it is important to conduct sensitivity analyses on the 
normative judgments in the discounting policy and to inform CBA users about alternative CBA 
outcomes based on these sensitivity analyses (e.g., Boadway, 2006; Kaplow et al., 2010; Nordhaus, 
2007; Stern, 2008). This allows CBA users to consider CBA outcomes which coincide with their 
own belief system. Interestingly, this view is shared by both leading descriptivist and 
prescriptivist scholars. For instance, Nordhaus (2007, page 701) argues that no sensible policy 
maker would base decisions on a single model or a single ethical perspective: “sensible decision 
making requires a robust set of alternative scenarios and sensitivity analyses”. Stern (2008), in turn, 
argues that value judgments must be discussed explicitly and the implications of different 
judgments should be examined. Kaplow et al. (2010) propose carrying out sensitivity analyses 
when an element of the discount rate ‘is’ grounded in empirical information but ‘could be’ based 
                                                        
10 Ideally, political-administrative judgments should also be made more transparent in the guidelines. However, 
as one reviewer rightfully noted, it is questionable whether it is realistic for such considerations to be 
communicated explicitly.   
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on fundamental ethical views, since this enables the CBA user with ethical views that do not 
coincide with the empirical information to make their own assessment.11 According to Kaplow et 
al. (2010) sensitivity analyses are often used when empirical parameters are uncertain, but the 
method is rarely used to analyze the impacts of diverging ethical judgments. Several scholars 
state that a clean separation of empirical and normative arguments in discounting policies is a 
clear benefit of normative sensitivity analyses (e.g., Goulder and Williams, 2012; Kaplow et al., 
2010). This makes discounting policies more transparent and easier to interpret. It also responds 
to the ambition of the Dutch Working Group to charge researchers with making value-neutral 
decisions, and to leave the ethical decisions to politicians. Normative sensitivity analyses can 
clarify to politicians and other CBA users that value judgments are inevitable when establishing 
discount rates. Mouter (2017a) finds that this can increase politicians’ use of CBA when forming 
judgments about candidate transport projects, as politicians argue that their trust in CBA’s 
impartiality increases when normative choices are made transparent. Furthermore, politicians 
state that increasing the awareness and recognition of the normative judgments underlying CBA 
diminishes the probability that politicians will kill the political debate using CBA (Mouter, 
2017b). Killing the political debate using CBA means that politicians portray CBA as an 
instrument which makes further political discussion obsolete because it covers the total political 
trade-off in an unambiguous and scientific way. This is regarded as one of the main downsides of 
CBA among Dutch politicians (Mouter, 2017b).  
 
One implication of incorporating normative sensitivity analyses into guidelines is that CBAs 
present two or more results. To assist CBA users in weighing up the multiple results, it is useful 
to thoroughly underpin the arguments for each set of value judgments.12 For instance, when CBA 
users receive CBAs which calculate net present values based on discount rates grounded in a 
descriptive and a prescriptive approach, it can be useful to list the arguments defending each 
approach. For instance, one argument to defend the descriptive approach is that using a 
prescriptivist social discount rate that is (substantially) lower than the market interest rate might 
divert financial resources from being put to better use and create an inefficient allocation of funds 
(Azar, 2007; Nordhaus, 2007). Moreover, it is recommended to communicate to CBA users that 
some prescriptive arguments that apply to transport projects that last a long time, with benefits 
accruing to both current and future cohorts (e.g., a new high-speed rail line or subsidizing electric 
vehicles), do not – or only to a limited extent – apply to transport projects with only intra-
temporal impacts (e.g., a modest road expansion).13 This enables CBA users to draw the 
conclusion that the descriptive approach is probably more relevant for the evaluation of projects 
with short term impacts than projects with long term impacts.  
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